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INTRODUCTION
The grant of subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts based on diversity of citizenship has, for centuries, required complete diversity between
parties to the litigation.1 If a case is brought in state court and complete
diversity exists between the parties, the defendant has the statutory right to
remove the case to federal court.2 Absent another basis for federal jurisdiction,
the lack of complete diversity strips the federal court of subject matter
jurisdiction, and the court is required to remand the case to state court.3
Therefore, the presence of a single nondiverse defendant is sufficient to
defeat diversity jurisdiction.
The doctrine of fraudulent joinder has arisen in response to plaintiffs’
efforts to take advantage of this complete diversity requirement and thereby
control whether a state or federal court hears their case. Fraudulent joinder
refers to a plaintiff ’s attempt to defeat complete diversity and generally
occurs in one of two ways: (1) a plaintiff commits actual fraud by inaccurately
pleading the citizenship of the parties to the lawsuit or (2) a plaintiff sues a
nondiverse defendant against whom the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of

1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (granting original jurisdiction to district courts over cases between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000); Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (imposing the complete diversity requirement).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant . . . .”).
3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012) (mandating remand if the federal court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction at any point in the litigation).
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action.4 This Comment focuses only on the second method, which is
litigated with much greater frequency than the first.5 In this context, the
diverse defendant will generally remove the case to federal court and argue
that the judge should ignore the citizenship of the nondiverse co-defendant
because the plaintiff has no chance of stating a claim against that defendant.6
If the federal court determines that the plaintiff has no cause of action
against the nondiverse defendant, the court is permitted to ignore that
defendant’s citizenship and thereby establish complete diversity.7 However,
if the court determines that the nondiverse defendant is properly joined,
then complete diversity is absent and the case must be remanded to state
court. The result of a fraudulent joinder dispute therefore determines
whether a suit will be heard in state or federal court—an important consideration for litigants.8
To resolve the fraudulent joinder question, the federal judge must look
to a source of law to determine whether the plaintiff has established a cause
of action against the nondiverse defendant. In many cases, all parties agree
on which law applies to the case; in those circumstances, the judge will
conduct the fraudulent joinder inquiry using the agreed-upon legal standards.
In some cases, however, the events giving rise to the litigation have connections to multiple jurisdictions and therefore multiple laws could potentially
apply. In these cases, the judge must decide which state’s law to use to
determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim against the nondiverse
defendant.
In such a case, it is not clear how a judge should approach this choice of
law determination or whether the judge is even permitted to make a choice
of law determination at all. On the one hand, if the nondiverse defendant is
properly joined, the federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
and arguably cannot make a choice of law determination. On the other
hand, there may be cases in which the plaintiff can state a claim against the
nondiverse defendant under one state’s substantive standard, but not under

4
5

Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2003).
James M. Underwood, From Proxy to Principle: Fraudulent Joinder Reconsidered, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 1013, 1019-20 (2006). Note that the term “fraudulent joinder” is also sometimes used to refer
to an inappropriately joined co-plaintiff or to the joinder of a claim that is procedurally flawed,
rather than flawed on the merits. Id. at 1020 n.32. These variations are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
6 Id. at 1019-20.
7 Matthew C. Monahan, Note, De-Frauding the System: Sham Plaintiffs and the Fraudulent
Joinder Doctrine, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1349 (2012).
8 See Underwood, supra note 5, at 1013-14 (noting that whether a case is tried before a state or
federal judge has a significant impact on the results of the adjudication of claims).
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another state’s standard. In these cases, the court cannot resolve the fraudulent joinder dispute without making a choice of law determination.
This Comment takes the position that a court must perform a choice of
law analysis as part of its fraudulent joinder inquiry. This determination is
necessary to decide whether a law could apply to the case that would sustain
the action against the nondiverse defendant. Further, the court should give
the same deference to the plaintiff ’s choice of law as it gives to the plaintiff ’s
choice of forum under the jurisdiction’s fraudulent joinder standard. This
conclusion draws upon the idea that choice of law is fundamentally a meritsbased inquiry and that a decision on the merits requires reference to an
applicable law. Therefore, a court cannot properly make a determination
about whether the suit against the nondiverse defendant has merit, or is
merely “fraudulent,” without selecting and applying an appropriate law.
Part I of this Comment discusses the legal standards and principles
behind diversity jurisdiction, fraudulent joinder, and choice of law. Part II
discusses the inconsistent approaches that courts have taken to choice of law
in the fraudulent joinder context. Finally, Part III argues that a choice of
law determination is necessary in a fraudulent joinder case because a federal
court cannot determine whether a plaintiff has a colorable claim against the
nondiverse defendant without reference to a colorable law. This Comment
contends that the choice of law determination should be made with reference
to the particular jurisdiction’s fraudulent joinder standard.
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO CHOICE OF LAW IN
FRAUDULENT JOINDER LITIGATION
This Part reviews the key legal standards that are relevant to choice of
law issues in fraudulent joinder litigation. Section A discusses the legal
authority for diversity jurisdiction and the justifications for federal courts to
hear diversity cases. Section B discusses the different standards courts use
to decide whether a party has been “fraudulently joined” to the litigation.
Section C reviews the most common choice of law approaches that courts
use to determine which state’s law applies to a case.
A. Diversity Jurisdiction and Its Justifications
The concept of jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship appears in
the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity . . . between Citizens of different States.”9 The
9

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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power of federal district courts to hear diversity cases is statutory. Section
1332 of the U.S. Code provides that district courts “shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000” and where the lawsuit is between “citizens of
different States.”10 The diversity requirement of section 1332 has long been
understood to require complete diversity of citizenship,11 meaning that each
plaintiff must be diverse from each defendant. By contrast, the Constitution
requires only minimal diversity,12 which provides for federal jurisdiction as
long as any one plaintiff is diverse from any one defendant.
The original justification for diversity jurisdiction is a matter of some
debate. Many commentators argued that diversity jurisdiction was necessary
to provide “a forum where parochial state laws would not be enforced”;
instead, the federal courts would apply a “general federal law” to those
cases.13 But as Professor Percy points out, this rationale cannot support the
existence of diversity jurisdiction today in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.14 At the time of the Constitutional
Convention, only a small number of delegates suggested that diversity
jurisdiction was designed to protect out-of-state citizens from local prejudice.15

10
11

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012).
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (“If there be two or more
joint plaintiffs, and two or more joint defendants, each of the plaintiffs must be capable of suing
each of the defendants, in the courts of the United States, in order to support the jurisdiction.”).
12 See C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 633 (2004)
(“Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on
diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.” (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Since the requirement
of complete diversity is not a constitutional requirement, Congress has the power to authorize
suits based on minimal diversity. See Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The
Improper Party Problem in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 785 (2006) (noting that
Congress approved class actions in federal court based on minimal diversity in 2005).
13 E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court Based on
Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 197 (2005).
14 Id. at 198; see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is
the law of the State. . . . There is no federal general common law.”).
15 See Percy, supra note 13, at 198. Although Professor Percy doubts the actual significance that
the concept of prejudice had in early debates around diversity jurisdiction, he notes that many
courts cite to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 61 (1809), as support for the proposition that diversity jurisdiction was intended to
combat prejudice against out-of-state parties. Percy, supra note 13, at 199; see, e.g., O’Brien v.
AVCO Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1033 (2d Cir. 1969) (explaining that the danger of prejudice was the
“historical rationale” for diversity jurisdiction and remains its “chief underlying support” (citing
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 87)).
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Today, although there is some dispute over whether such prejudice exists,16
the fear of local prejudice is a commonly cited justification for the existence
of diversity jurisdiction.17
Diversity jurisdiction is undoubtedly a powerful tool that has a very real
effect on litigation. If diversity exists, a defendant may remove a case
initially filed in state court to federal court.18 On the other hand, if the
plaintiff can show at any point during the litigation that complete diversity
does not exist, then the district court must remand the case to state court.19
Whether a suit will be heard in federal or state court is often extremely
important to litigants. In many cases, ensuring that the most desirable
forum hears the case is “the most important strategic decision a party makes
in a lawsuit.”20 Because state courts are generally considered more favorable
toward plaintiffs, many plaintiffs file in state court and fight removal to
federal court; by contrast, defendants have a strong incentive to remove the
case.21 This practice indicates that the concerns about bias toward in-state
parties are likely justified.22 In fact, studies have shown that the result of the
dispute over removal to federal court has a strong predictive effect on the

16 See Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 54 n.26 (2009) (collecting authorities that have argued
both for and against the idea that local bias is no longer sufficient to sustain diversity jurisdiction).
17 See, e.g., Díaz-Rodríguez v. Pep Boys Corp., 410 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2005) (“A primary
purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to shield foreign parties from the prejudice they might face as
outsiders in state court.”); Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1152 n.3 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“The original central justification for diversity jurisdiction was grounded in the fear of prejudice
against outsiders from other states, or in other words, the lack of confidence in the adequacy of
state court justice.”).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending.”).
19 Id. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).
20 Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 55-58 (explaining that forum selection can have an impact on
geographic location, the substantive and procedural laws applied in the case, and the value of a
case at settlement).
21 See Percy, supra note 13, at 205-06 & n.110 (explaining that generally plaintiffs prefer to
litigate in state court and defendants prefer to litigate in federal court for a variety of reasons,
including differences in procedural rules and the general perception among litigants that state
court judges are more favorable to plaintiffs and federal judges are more favorable to defendants);
see also Heather R. Barber, Removal and Remand, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1555, 1558 (2004) (noting
that federal courts are believed to be more defendant-friendly).
22 See Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 57 (“In reality, a case does not receive the same treatment
or have the same chance of success in federal court as it does in state court, especially when local
plaintiffs sue large, out-of-state corporations.” (footnote omitted)).
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outcome of the litigation.23 Putting concerns of bias aside, the federal forum
provides a number of procedural advantages for defendants, “includ[ing] the
increased availability of summary judgment, the possibility of separating the
trial into liability and damages phases, the increased role of the federal
judge in the scheduling process, and federal evidentiary laws that may be
more favorable to defendants.”24 Given these distinctions between state and
federal courts, the ultimate forum for a case remains critically important to
both parties to the litigation.25
B. Development of Fraudulent Joinder Law
Fraudulent joinder is a direct response to the relative advantages and
disadvantages of litigating in state or federal court. A plaintiff ’s incentive to
“fraudulently join” a nondiverse defendant is fairly clear—the nondiverse
defendant destroys complete diversity and allows the plaintiff to litigate in
the more favorable state court forum. The development of fraudulent
joinder doctrine was a response to this sort of jurisdictional gamesmanship
by plaintiffs. The doctrine “permits federal courts to essentially ignore the
inclusion in a lawsuit of a nondiverse party who would otherwise destroy
federal diversity jurisdiction when the district court concludes that the
party’s joinder is a sham.”26 Although this doctrine is necessary to prevent
diverse defendants from being wrongfully denied their statutory right to
remove to federal court, its exact contours remain largely undefined. The
fraudulent joinder doctrine was originally elaborated in a series of Supreme
Court opinions but has not been addressed by the Court in many years. As a
result, lower federal courts have developed a number of competing standards
to determine whether a nondiverse defendant has been fraudulently joined.
This Section traces the development of the fraudulent joinder doctrine
through Supreme Court precedent and into the modern day.

23 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 (1998)
(“[I]n diversity cases, the win rate drops from 71% in original cases to 34% in removed cases.”).
Although the difference between a state and federal forum is undoubtedly impactful, Clermont
and Eisenberg’s study likely overstates the effect. As the authors recognize, the strength of the
cases that are removed and the quality of the lawyering in those cases may also contribute to the
low win rates. Id. at 603-05. However, even accounting for these factors, the authors found that
removal had a significant effect on outcome. Id.
24 Monahan, supra note 7, at 1342 n.6 (citations omitted).
25 See Percy, supra note 13, at 191-92 (noting that defendants have become “increasingly
resistant” to litigating in state court and that the business lobby has succeeded in getting many of
the largest cases, such as class actions, pushed to federal court).
26 Underwood, supra note 5, at 1018.
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1. The Supreme Court’s Elaboration of Fraudulent Joinder
The Supreme Court has referenced the fraudulent joinder doctrine on
multiple occasions but has made only limited holdings as to the contours of
the doctrine. Most modern development of fraudulent joinder jurisprudence has occurred in the lower courts. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
cases provide an important framework for understanding fraudulent joinder
and for evaluating the legal standards used in the lower courts today.
The Supreme Court has traditionally been resistant to defendants’
attempts to alter the structure of the lawsuit as pleaded by the plaintiff.
Generally, “[a] plaintiff is master of her complaint and thus is permitted to
preclude removal in some circumstances.”27 In an early case, the Court
noted that “[a] defendant has no right to say that an action shall be several
which the plaintiff seeks to make joint. . . . [I]t cannot deprive a plaintiff of
his right to prosecute his suit to final decision in his own way.”28 The Court
explained that the question of removability must be decided based on the
plaintiff ’s pleadings at the time of removal and that a defendant’s showing
that liability is several could not alter the case pleaded by the plaintiff.29 The
Court would later explain that “the fact that the defendants might have
been sued separately affords no ground for removal,” again giving deference
to the plaintiff ’s decision to pursue defendants jointly.30
However, the Court has also been conscious of attempts by litigants to
manipulate jurisdiction. Where the plaintiff “attempt[s] to commit a fraud
upon the jurisdiction of the Federal courts[,]” the Court has stated that “the
Federal courts may and should take such action as will defeat attempts to
wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in the Federal courts of the
protection of their rights in those tribunals.”31 Although the Court used the
term “fraud” in this early articulation of the fraudulent joinder doctrine, the
meaning of “fraud” in this context was largely unclear. Initially, the Court
seemed to imply that proving fraudulent joinder required a showing of bad
faith on the part of the plaintiff.32 The subject of the bad faith requirement
27 Monahan, supra note 7, at 1347 (noting that a plaintiff may manipulate the forum that hears
her lawsuit and intentionally prevent removal in certain circumstances).
28 Ala. Great S. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 214-15 (1906) (quoting Powers v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 97 (1898)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29 Id. at 215-16; see also Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939) (holding that the
court of appeals erred in considering the plaintiff ’s second amended complaint rather than the
plaintiff ’s complaint at the time of the petition for removal).
30 Jenkins, 305 U.S. at 538.
31 Thompson, 200 U.S. at 218.
32 See id. at 220 (declining to find a fraud on the jurisdiction of the federal courts because the
defendant had not attacked the good faith of the plaintiff ’s pleadings).
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came directly before the Court in Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping
Co., where the plaintiff defended against a fraudulent joinder claim by
arguing that there was no evidence of bad faith on his part.33 The Court
held that, even where fraud is directly at issue, knowledge could be imputed
to the plaintiff where he “willfully closes his eyes to information within his
reach.”34 The Court found that the nondiverse defendant had been fraudulently joined in the case and offered the following explanation:
While the plaintiff, in good faith, may proceed in the state courts
upon a cause of action which he alleges to be joint, it is equally true
that the Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to
prevent a removal to a Federal court where one has that right, and
should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the
Federal court as to permit the state courts, in proper cases, to retain
their own jurisdiction.35
In other words, the Wecker Court acknowledged that fraudulent joinder
could be found if the plaintiff ’s belief in the propriety of the joinder was so
unfounded as to be objectively unreasonable. Although the requirements of
proving fraudulent joinder have seemingly weakened to no longer demand a
showing of bad faith, the Court has clearly placed the burden of proving
fraudulent joinder on the removing defendant.36 Therefore, the fraudulent
joinder inquiry begins with the assumption that the plaintiff ’s joinder of the
nondiverse defendant is legitimate.37
The Court has drawn a distinction between a defendant’s claim of
fraudulent joinder and a claim that the plaintiff ’s entire case is meritless. In
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Cockrell, an estate administrator brought
suit in state court against a diverse railway company and its nondiverse
employees after a train struck and killed the decedent.38 The railway argued
that its employees were not negligent and therefore had been fraudulently
joined.39 The Court explained that the liability of the railway company
33
34
35
36

204 U.S. 176, 185 (1907).
Id.
Id. at 185-86.
See, e.g., Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939) (remanding the case upon finding
that the removing defendant did not satisfy this burden).
37 The burden placed on the removing party is significant and is often described as a “heavy
burden.” See, e.g., Balberdi v. Lewis, No. 12-00582, 2013 WL 1296286, at *2 (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2013)
(“A defendant asserting fraudulent joinder bears the heavy burden of facing both the strong
presumption against removal jurisdiction as well as the general presumption against fraudulent
joinder.”), adopted by 2013 WL 1291780 (D. Haw. Mar. 27, 2013).
38 232 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1914).
39 Id. at 150-51.
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depended on the liability of its two employees; therefore, the railway’s claim
that its employees were not negligent was no different than saying that the
plaintiff ’s case was “ill founded as to all the defendants.”40 The Court
explained that this argument went to the merits of the entire action, not to
the joinder of the individual defendants; therefore, a finding of fraudulent
joinder was improper.41 This holding has been interpreted by some courts as
articulating a “common defense rule”: a defendant cannot prove fraudulent
joinder of individual defendants by raising a “common defense” intended to
negate the case against all defendants. The use of a “common defense” may
indicate that the case as a whole has no merit, but it does not prove that a
particular defendant was fraudulently joined to the case.42
2. The Lower Courts and Modern Fraudulent Joinder Standards
Because the Supreme Court has not fully addressed the doctrine of
fraudulent joinder for many years, much of its development has taken place
in the lower courts. The frequency of fraudulent joinder litigation has
increased significantly since the Supreme Court’s most recent decision in
Pullman Co. v. Jenkins in 1939.43 The issue of fraudulent joinder is especially
relevant to modern tort litigation. Suits against diverse drug manufacturers
are joined with suits against nondiverse pharmacists, suits against diverse
product manufacturers are joined with suits against nondiverse retailers, and
suits against diverse insurance companies are joined with suits against
nondiverse insurance agents.44 The standard applied to the fraudulent
joinder inquiry in a given jurisdiction is important, as some jurisdictions
allow a more searching inquiry into the merits of the case than others. As
Professor Percy points out, fraudulent joinder litigation is uniquely problematic because, while fraudulent joinder is a jurisdictional issue, it also
40
41
42

Id. at 153.
Id. at 153-54.
See, e.g., Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2004) (“When the
only proffered justification for improper joinder is that there is no reasonable basis for predicting
recovery against the in-state defendant, and that showing is equally dispositive of all defendants
rather than to the in-state defendants alone, the requisite showing has not been made.”); In re New
Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d 288, 300 (D. Mass. 2004)
(“[F]raudulent joinder does not exist when an argument offered to prove the fraudulent joinder of
non-diverse defendants simultaneously shows that no case exists against the diverse defendant or
defendants. In those circumstances, no legitimate reason exists to label the non-diverse defendants
as fraudulently joined.”).
43 See Percy, supra note 13, at 192 (noting that fraudulent joinder litigation has “increased
dramatically” and is “becoming a prominent and time-consuming aspect of complex tort
litigation”).
44 Id. at 192-93.
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requires courts to evaluate the merits of the complaint against the nondiverse defendant.45 “The inescapable tension between protecting diverse
defendants’ right to remove and ensuring that district courts do not exceed
their statutory jurisdiction” has created a collection of competing legal
standards among the lower courts in the fraudulent joinder context.46
Commentators debate how many fraudulent joinder standards actually exist
and recognize subtle variations among courts within each “standard.”47
There appear to be at least three distinct standards.
a. No Reasonable Basis Standard
Under the first standard, the removing defendant must show that the
plaintiff has “no reasonable basis” for her claim against the nondiverse
defendant. The Eighth Circuit, in Filla v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,48
provides one interpretation of this standard. The court in Filla explained
that “a proper review should give paramount consideration to the reasonableness of the basis underlying the state claim. Where applicable state
precedent precludes the existence of a cause of action against a defendant,
joinder is fraudulent.”49 On the other hand, “if there is a ‘colorable’ cause of
action—that is, if the state law might impose liability on the resident
defendant under the facts alleged—then there is no fraudulent joinder.”50
b. No Possibility of Recovery Standard
Under the second standard, the removing defendant must show that the
plaintiff has absolutely “no possibility of recovery” against the nondiverse
defendant. Unlike the “no reasonable basis” standard, this standard focuses
on the likelihood of the plaintiff ’s ability to recover, rather than on the
plaintiff ’s ability to state a claim. The Fourth Circuit, in Hartley v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., stated this standard as follows: “To show fraudulent
joinder, the removing party must demonstrate either ‘outright fraud in the
45 See id. at 193 (stating that “federal courts evaluating allegations of fraudulent joinder must
walk a fine line between appropriately exercising jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction and
inappropriately determining the merits of a case which lacks complete diversity”).
46 Id.
47 Compare Matthew J. Richardson, Clarifying and Limiting Fraudulent Joinder, 58 FLA. L.
REV. 119, 146-47 (2006) (noting that there are roughly two camps of standards in fraudulent
joinder cases, but identifying variations within each camp), with Underwood, supra note 5, at 102223 (arguing that at least three fraudulent joinder standards have evolved and noting that it is often
difficult to determine which standard a court is applying).
48 336 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2003).
49 Id. at 810.
50 Id. (footnote omitted).
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plaintiff ’s pleading of jurisdictional facts’ or that ‘there is no possibility that
the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state
defendant in state court.’”51 The court went on to explain that “[t]he party
alleging fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden—it must show that the
plaintiff cannot establish a claim even after resolving all issues of law and
fact in the plaintiff ’s favor.”52 This “heavy burden” language is a common
refrain in fraudulent joinder cases.53 The court in Hartley also noted that the
fraudulent joinder analysis is “even more favorable to the plaintiff than the
standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss.”54
c. No Reasonable Possibility of Recovery Standard
A third standard requires the defendant to show that the plaintiff has
“no reasonable possibility of recovery” from the nondiverse defendant. In
Gray ex rel. Rudd v. Beverly Enterprises-Mississippi, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
explained that under this standard, the removing defendant must show that
there is “no reasonable basis for predicting that the plaintiff will recover in
state court.”55 Although this standard uses terminology similar to the “no
reasonable basis” standard, they are distinct. Unlike the “no reasonable
basis” standard, this standard focuses on the possibility of recovery, not on
the possibility of stating a claim. This standard is also distinct from the “no
possibility of recovery” standard because it is more generous to the removing
defendant: rather than having to show that the plaintiff has “absolutely no
possibility” of recovering against the nondiverse defendant, the removing
defendant need only show that the possibility is not reasonable.56 The court
in Gray made clear that this third standard was adopted as an intentional
shift away from the “no possibility of recovery” standard and that it viewed
the two standards as distinct.57 Moreover, the court stated that the standard
51 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229,
232 (4th Cir. 1993)).
52 Id.
53 See, e.g., Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The defendant
seeking removal bears a heavy burden of proving fraudulent joiner [sic], and all factual and legal
issues must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.”); Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73 (7th
Cir. 1992) (“An out-of-state defendant who wants to remove must bear a heavy burden to establish
fraudulent joinder.”).
54 187 F.3d at 424.
55 390 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2004).
56 Id.
57 See id. (“Though our earlier fraudulent joinder cases had been uncertain as to whether a
removing defendant must demonstrate an absence of any possibility of recovery in state
court, . . . the defendant must demonstrate only that there is no reasonable basis for predicting
that the plaintiff will recover in state court.”).
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was meant to be similar to the standard for a motion to dismiss,58 whereas
the “no possibility of recovery” standard is intended to be more favorable
than the standard for a motion to dismiss.59 Although there are variations in
these standards among the circuit courts, in any case the burden to establish
the existence of federal jurisdiction rests on the removing defendant.60
3. Extrinsic Evidence
When resolving a fraudulent joinder question, a court is allowed to look
beyond the pleadings and engage in a more searching inquiry of the
evidence than would normally be allowed at such a preliminary stage of the
litigation.61 All circuit courts allow district courts to look at extrinsic
evidence to decide the fraudulent joinder issue.62 However, courts disagree
on the extent to which this evidence can be used.63 Although the law allows
district courts to consider extrinsic evidence, some will nonetheless confine
their review to the plaintiff ’s complaint at the time of removal.64 Other
courts will review the plaintiff ’s complaint first, and then look to relevant
affidavits to determine if there exist sufficient facts suggesting a possibility
of recovery against the alleged fraudulently joined defendant.65 Perhaps
most radically, the Fifth Circuit has permitted review of factual allegations
in the complaint, affidavits, and deposition transcripts as part of its fraudulent
joinder determination.66 Under this standard, courts are “nearly compelled”
to pierce the pleadings in fraudulent joinder cases.67
58 See id. (noting that the standards for fraudulent joinder and for a motion to dismiss are
similar “in that the crucial question is whether the plaintiff has set out a valid claim under
applicable state law”).
59 See Hartley, 187 F.3d at 424 (“[The fraudulent joinder] standard is even more favorable to
the plaintiff than the standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss . . . .”).
60 See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 540 (1939) (recognizing the defendant had to
show “a separable controversy which was wholly between citizens of different States”).
61 See Monahan, supra note 7, at 1350 (noting that a federal court is permitted to “pierce the
pleadings to determine whether a plaintiff has a legitimate claim against the diversity-destroying
defendant”).
62 Richardson, supra note 47, at 148.
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Lynch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 934 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(limiting the court’s fraudulent joinder inquiry to the facts alleged in the plaintiff ’s complaint).
65 See, e.g., Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461-62 (2d Cir. 1998) (determining
that the plaintiff ’s complaint did not allege a factual basis for recovery against the nondiverse
defendant and that the information in the affidavits did not cure this deficiency).
66 See B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549, 551 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981)
(explaining that while review of these documents is permitted, the district court should not have
conducted a four-day evidentiary hearing that involved exploration of factual issues affecting the
liability determination).
67 Richardson, supra note 47, at 152.
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The piercing of pleadings allowed in fraudulent joinder cases raises
some concerns. Taken too far, this practice could result in a pretrial of
merits issues before the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is established.68
As a result, courts have noted that this piercing must be, to some degree,
“limited.”69 Even in the Fifth Circuit, where the scope of the fraudulent
joinder inquiry resembles the scope on review of a summary judgment
motion, courts have been careful to note that the standard applied to the
fraudulent joinder question should be “closer to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.”70
C. Choice of Law Approaches
In understanding the intersection of these fraudulent joinder doctrines
and choice of law, it is first necessary to lay a background in choice of law
principles. In general, each forum has its own “choice of law rule.” A forum
almost always applies its own choice of law rule.71 A federal court sitting in
diversity applies the choice of law rule of the state in which it sits and uses
that rule to choose the appropriate law to apply to a case.72 For example, a
forum’s choice of law rule could be to “always apply the law of the forum.”73
In that case, the forum would simply apply its own law to every case.
Although there are many choice of law rules, the most important for the
68 See id. at 143-44 & 144 n.151 (warning that piercing the pleadings risks an “unconstitutional
invasion of the federal district court upon the state court,” but noting that a limited piercing is
constitutionally permissible (internal quotation marks omitted)).
69 See, e.g., Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that some
piercing of the pleadings is appropriate in fraudulent joinder cases, but holding that the district
court’s “summary judgment type inquiry” resembled a decision on the merits and therefore
exceeded permissible bounds).
70 McKee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Richardson, supra
note 47, at 152 (“[P]anels of the Fifth Circuit that make use of the summary judgment language
often are careful to distinguish their statement of the law regarding the scope of inquiry from the
standard applied to the facts and law concerning the plaintiff ’s claims against the nondiverse
defendant.”).
71 In certain situations, a court may take notice of another forum’s choice of law rules. See
generally Erwin N. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1938) (discussing
circumstances in which a state refers to another state’s choice of law rule).
72 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
73 This choice of law rule, “lex fori,” is very rarely used. See Damon C. Andrews & John M.
Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313, 349, 384 (2013)
(noting that only two jurisdictions overtly use lex fori and that it is a “parochial” approach that
“openly favor[s] local law”). The use of lex fori arguably creates problems with the Full Faith and
Credit clause because it universally ignores all other state’s laws. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1
(“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State.”); see also Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-23
(1985) (holding that a Kansas court’s universal application of its own law to all parties in a class
action was unconstitutional because Kansas lacked sufficient contacts to create an interest in the
claims unrelated to the state).
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purposes of this Comment are the “traditional” approach, the “interest
analysis” approach, and the “most significant relationship” approach.74
1. Traditional Approach
The traditional approach to choice of law is memorialized in the First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws.75 The traditional approach is based on the
idea that each forum’s laws are “territorially bounded”—that is, each state’s
law applies only to events that occur within the borders of that state.76
Although the traditional approach contains many rules for different scenarios, perhaps the most relevant here is the rule for torts. In a tort case, a court
following the traditional approach will apply the law of the “place of wrong,”
which is the place “where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for
an alleged tort takes place.”77
Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll78 provides a useful example
of this approach in practice. In Carroll, the plaintiff was an employee of the
railroad company, an Alabama corporation.79 The plaintiff, a citizen of
Alabama, was employed under a contract made in Alabama and worked on a
railroad extending from Alabama to Mississippi.80 It was the duty of certain
employees to check the strength of the links between the cars while the
train was still in Alabama.81 A particular link, however, left Alabama in a
defective condition.82 When the train entered Mississippi, the defective link
broke and injured the plaintiff.83 Under Mississippi law, an employer was
not liable for damages caused by the negligence of an employee’s “fellow
servant”; by contrast, Alabama had abrogated this fellow servant rule by
statute.84 As a result, the plaintiff could only recover from his employer if
Alabama law applied. However, the court found that, because the injury
occurred in Mississippi, applying the law of the place of wrong meant that
Mississippi law must apply.85
74 See Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 583 (1996)
(noting that three-fourths of states use either the traditional approach of the First Restatement of
Conflicts or the most significant relationship approach of the Second Restatement).
75 See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF L AWS (1934).
76 KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF L AWS 3 (2010).
77 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
78 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
79 Id. at 803.
80 Id. at 803-04.
81 Id. at 804.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 805.
85 Id. at 809.
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As can be seen in Carroll, the traditional approach can be criticized
because it sometimes leads to arbitrary results. Even though almost every
contact in the case was with Alabama, the court was bound to apply Mississippi law under the theory that Alabama law had no force for wrongs
occurring outside of its territory.
2. Interest Analysis Approach
Interest analysis developed in response to the problems with the traditional approach exemplified in Carroll. The basic idea behind interest
analysis is that a court should only apply the law of a state when that state
actually has an “interest” in the outcome of the dispute. If only one state has
an interest in the outcome of a case, this is merely a “false conflict” between
states’ policies, and the law of the interested state should apply.86 However,
if both states are interested, or neither is interested, interest analysis deems
the conflict unresolvable, and mandates the application of the forum’s law.87
Under this approach, a case like Carroll would likely be deemed a “false
conflict.” Since all of the parties were from Alabama, and the negligence
occurred in Alabama, Mississippi would have little interest in applying its
law to the dispute; therefore, Alabama law would apply under an interest
analysis approach.
3. Most Significant Relationship Approach
A final approach to choice of law that is prevalent today is set forth in
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.88 The Second Restatement
“advises courts to apply the law of the state with ‘the most significant
relationship’ to a particular issue.”89 The state with the most significant
relationship is determined based on a multitude of factors, including the
needs of the interstate system, the policies of the forum, the policies of
other interested states, the expectations of the parties, the policies of the
particular field of law, the predictability of the result, and the ease of
applying the law.90 These factors are then considered in light of other
factors depending on the type of case at bar. For example, in a tort case, the
Second Restatement advises a court to consider factors such as the place of
86 See ROOSEVELT, supra note 76, at 50 (“In [false conflict] cases, only one state is interested,
and therefore applying its law advances its policies without harm to the policies of any other state.”).
87 See id. at 49 (recommending application of forum law in unprovided-for and true conflicts
cases).
88 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
89 ROOSEVELT, supra note 76, at 80.
90 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L AWS § 6 (1971).
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injury, the place of conduct, the domicile of the parties, and the center of
the relationship between the parties.91
Presumably, applying the Second Restatement approach in Carroll, the
court would have chosen Alabama law. This result is almost certain because
nearly every factor—including the policies of the forum, the predictability
of the result, the relationship between the parties, the place of conduct, and
the domicile of the parties—points toward Alabama law. As a result, a court
would be hard pressed to find that Mississippi had the “most significant
relationship” to the dispute.
II. CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO CHOICE OF LAW IN
FRAUDULENT JOINDER LITIGATION
It is not clear how a court should approach a fraudulent joinder analysis
when faced with a choice of law issue. The law is not well settled on this
point, and the few courts that have dealt with this issue have reached
conflicting conclusions. This conflict arises because resolution of the
fraudulent joinder question determines whether a federal court has subject
matter jurisdiction. Some courts may be hesitant to make a choice of law
determination without first establishing that subject matter jurisdiction
exists. These conflicts implicate the policies behind diversity jurisdiction
and the different approaches to choice of law.
The proper resolution of this issue is essential because the law applied to
the case may determine whether or not a nondiverse defendant is considered
fraudulently joined. The fraudulent joinder determination, in turn, determines whether the case will be heard in state or federal court—which will
often affect whether the parties will litigate the case or settle. This Part
reviews the approaches that courts have taken to the problem so far.
A. Refusing to Engage in Choice of Law
Some courts have simply refused to make a choice of law determination
when a case has been removed to federal court on the basis of fraudulent
joinder, and the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court has not yet
been established. In Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., after a fire
destroyed their home, the plaintiffs, citizens of California, filed suit in
California state court against State Farm, a citizen of Illinois, and various
“John Doe” State Farm employees, who were alleged to be citizens of

91

Id. § 145.
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California.92 State Farm removed the case to federal court on the grounds of
diversity of citizenship.93 State Farm then successfully moved to have the
case transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania.94 The district court
applied Pennsylvania law and found the plaintiffs’ claims were timebarred.95 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that complete diversity was
lacking and, therefore, the federal district court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction; State Farm argued that the “John Doe” defendants had been
fraudulently joined and should be ignored for the purposes of diversity.96
The Third Circuit determined that the plaintiffs’ conduct was “consistent with an intention to actually proceed against at least some Doe
defendants.”97 The court doubted whether the plaintiffs could maintain an
action against insurance agents under California insurance law but could not
say definitively that there was no “colorable” basis for the claims.98 State
Farm argued that, under Pennsylvania law, there was no cause of action
available against insurance agents, and therefore there could be no colorable
basis for the plaintiffs’ claims against the Doe insurance agents.99 The court
declined to decide whether California or Pennsylvania law applied, explaining
that “[a] federal court cannot engage in a choice of law analysis where
diversity jurisdiction is not first established.”100 The court remanded the
case, noting that the insurance agents could be dismissed later if State Farm
proved that application of Pennsylvania law was correct in state court.101
The court in Abels prohibited a choice of law determination in the
fraudulent joinder context, indicating that it was incapable of making a
choice of law determination without first establishing its subject matter
jurisdiction.102 Since a fraudulent joinder inquiry may end with a disposition that diversity does not exist and the federal court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction, the court concluded that engaging in a choice of law
analysis was inappropriate.103

92 770 F.2d 26, 27-29
93 Id. at 28.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 28-29.
97 Id. at 32.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 33 n.10.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 33.
102 Id. at 33 n.10.
103 See id.

(3d Cir. 1985).
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B. Reasonable Possibility Test
Some courts will not engage in a full choice of law analysis, but rather
will simply ask whether the plaintiff ’s suggested choice of law is “colorable”;
if so, the court will remand. In Morris v. Nuzzo, Sampson, an Indiana
citizen, killed his passenger Morris, also an Indiana citizen, while operating
a vehicle in Indiana.104 Morris’s estate negotiated with Nuzzo, a claims
adjuster for Sampson’s insurance company and a citizen of Ohio, but failed
to settle the claim.105 Consequently, Morris’s estate brought a wrongful
death suit against Sampson and received a $1.2 million verdict.106 Sampson
assigned his rights against his insurer to Morris’s estate.107 The estate
subsequently filed suit against the insurance company and Nuzzo in Ohio
state court, alleging breach of contract and bad faith failure to pay an
insurance claim.108 The insurance company and Nuzzo successfully removed
the case to federal court; the estate moved to remand on the grounds that
Nuzzo was a citizen of Ohio and could not remove under the “forum
defendant rule.”109 The insurance company and Nuzzo argued that Nuzzo
had been fraudulently joined in order to defeat federal jurisdiction.110 The
district court performed a choice of law analysis and determined that
Indiana law should be applied because Indiana had the “most significant
relationship” to the case.111 And because Indiana law would prohibit recovery
against Nuzzo, even though the claim would have been cognizable under
Ohio law, the district court denied the estate’s motion to remand.112
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that “the fraudulent joinder analysis
allows district courts to ‘assume’ limited jurisdiction over an otherwise
nonremovable action to consider the viability of claims against an alleged
fraudulently joined defendant.”113 The court explained that, to make the
fraudulent joinder determination, “the district court must necessarily
predict what substantive law the state court would apply. . . . [T]herefore,

104
105
106
107
108
109

718 F.3d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012) (“A civil action otherwise removable solely on
the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought.”).
110 Morris, 718 F.3d at 663-64.
111 Id. at 664.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 671.
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the district court must engage in some type of choice of law decision.”114
The court held that “choice of law decisions can be made as part of the
fraudulent joinder analysis where the choice of law decision is dispositive to
the outcome, and where the removing defendant bears the same ‘heavy
burden’ to make the choice of law showing” as it bears to make the fraudulent joinder showing.115 The court further elaborated:
A choice of law decision is dispositive to the fraudulent joinder analysis
when the plaintiff and the removing defendant disagree over the
substantive law that should govern the claim against the alleged
fraudulently joined defendant, and where the district court determines that the claim stands a reasonable possibility of success under
the plaintiff ’s suggested choice of law but not under the removing
defendant’s. In that case, the removing defendant can demonstrate
fraudulent joinder only by showing that, after resolving all issues of
fact and law in favor of the plaintiff, there is no reasonable possibility
that the state court would apply the plaintiff ’s suggested choice of
law.116
The court of appeals held that the district court erred in deciding the choice
of law question directly, rather than applying the “reasonable possibility”
standard of the fraudulent joinder analysis to the choice of law determination.117 The court held that, in this context, it should be very difficult for the
defendant to prove his choice of law: if “the plaintiff could satisfy even one
applicable choice of law factor [in the most significant relationship analysis],
[the federal court] should end the analysis there and remand the case.”118
The court decided that because there was at least a reasonable possibility
that a state court would have applied Ohio law, Nuzzo was not fraudulently
joined and the case should have been remanded.119
114
115
116

Id.
Id. at 672.
Id. The Morris court considered this reasonable possibility approach to be consistent with
the approach of the Third Circuit in Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 F.2d 26 (3d Cir.
1985). Morris, 718 F.3d at 672 n.7; see also supra Section II.A. Although the Abels court refused to
engage in a choice of law, the Morris court interpreted the Abels opinion as having first found a
reasonable possibility that the plaintiff ’s suggested choice of law would apply. Id. However, it is
difficult to read the Abels and Morris opinions as articulating identical approaches. The Abels court
merely stated in a footnote that there was a colorable basis for plaintiff ’s suggested choice of law
and indicated that, were there no such basis, the result “might be different.” 770 F.2d at 33 n.10.
Unlike the Morris court, the Abels court did not indicate if or how it would actually undertake the
choice of law analysis.
117 Morris, 718 F.3d at 672.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 674.
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C. Resolving Ambiguity in Favor of Plaintiff ’s Choice of Law
Rather than engage in a choice of law analysis, some courts have simply
declared that a disputed choice of law issue is ambiguous and should
therefore be resolved in favor of the plaintiff ’s choice of law. In Bellorin v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., the plaintiffs, Mexican and Venezuelan citizens,
brought suit under Texas law in Texas state court against Firestone, Bridgestone, Ford Motor Company, Smithers Transportation Test Centers, and
Del Rio Test Centers.120 The defendants removed to federal court, where
the plaintiffs argued that since they were citizens of Mexico and Venezuela
and Bridgestone was a Japanese corporation, foreign parties were on both
sides of the controversy and no diversity existed.121 Additionally, plaintiffs
argued that because Smithers and Del Rio were Texas citizens, the defendants
were prohibited from removing by the forum-defendant rule.122 The
defendants countered that Bridgestone, Smithers, and Del Rio were
fraudulently joined.123 They argued that Mexican or Venezuelan law applied
to the dispute and neither of those laws provided a cause of action against
Bridgestone, Firestone, Del Rio, or Smithers.124
The court determined that, while the defendants may eventually prove
that Mexican or Venezuelan law should apply, the choice of law question was
too uncertain at that stage of the litigation.125 Rather than engaging in a
choice of law analysis, the court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the
plaintiffs’ choice of law and remanded the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.126
D. Applying Forum Law
Some courts have similarly avoided a full choice of law analysis by
applying the forum’s law to the fraudulent joinder determination and
reasoning that they do not yet have jurisdiction to conduct a choice of law
inquiry. In Balberdi v. Lewis, the plaintiff filed suit in Hawaii state court
against FedEx and two nondiverse individual defendants.127 FedEx removed
to federal court on the basis that the nondiverse individual defendants were
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

236 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
Id. at 676.
Id. at 677.
Id.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id.
No. 12-00582, 2013 WL 1296286, at *1 (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2013), adopted by 2013 WL 1291780
(D. Haw. Mar. 27, 2013).

624

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 603

fraudulently joined.128 The district court determined that whether the
plaintiff had stated a claim against the individual defendants depended on
whether Pennsylvania or Hawaii law applied to the allegations.129 However,
the court stated that it could not engage in a choice of law analysis where
diversity jurisdiction had not yet been established.130 Therefore, since the
action was commenced in Hawaii, the court applied the forum’s own law to
determine the fraudulent joinder question.131 Applying Hawaii law, the
court found no fraudulent joinder and remanded the case.132
E. Conducting a Choice of Law Inquiry Prior to the
Fraudulent Joinder Analysis
Many courts decide the choice of law issue before even reaching the
fraudulent joinder question.133 In Asperger v. Shop Vac Corp., the plaintiff
brought suit against Shop Vac, a product manufacturer, and Sears, a retailer,
in Illinois state court after he was injured using a Shop Vac.134 Because the
plaintiff and Sears were both citizens of Illinois, the presence of Sears in the
lawsuit defeated diversity.135 Shop Vac removed on the basis that Sears had
been fraudulently joined.136 It was initially unclear whether Illinois or
Delaware law applied to the dispute, so the court applied the “most significant
relationship” choice of law rule and determined that Illinois law governed
the dispute.137 The court then applied Illinois law and determined that the
plaintiff had a reasonable basis for recovery against Sears; therefore, Sears
had not been fraudulently joined, and the case was remanded.138
The variety of approaches courts take to choice of law in fraudulent
joinder litigation leads to inconsistent results. This uncertainty suggests that
a uniform approach to these cases would be valuable.

128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3, *5.
See, e.g., Collins v. Flynn, No. 08-59, 2008 WL 3851842, at *3-5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2008)
(determining Massachusetts law applied before finding that the defendant was fraudulently joined
under Massachusetts standards); Boydstun Metal Works, Inc. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., No. 99480, 1999 WL 476265, at *5-6 (D. Or. May 19, 1999) (deciding that Oregon law applied to the
dispute, then using Oregon case law to resolve the fraudulent joinder question).
134 524 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (S.D. Ill. 2007).
135 Id. at 1092.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 1093.
138 Id. at 1096-97.
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III. APPLYING FRAUDULENT JOINDER RULES TO THE
CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS
Many of these approaches to choice of law in the fraudulent joinder
context are flawed. When a court is faced with a choice of law problem in
fraudulent joinder litigation, it must perform a choice of law inquiry—the
issue cannot be avoided for the sake of convenience. The court should
perform the choice of law analysis using the same standard as the relevant
jurisdiction’s fraudulent joinder rule. For example, a jurisdiction may
require a removing defendant to show that there is “absolutely no possibility” that the plaintiff can recover against the nondiverse defendant. In that
case, the defendant must also show that there is “absolutely no possibility”
that the plaintiff ’s choice of law will apply to the case. This approach is
faithful to the “heavy burden” placed on the removing defendant and the
general presumption against removal.139
A. Refusing to Make a Choice of Law Determination
Courts cannot simply refuse to engage in a choice of law analysis in
fraudulent joinder cases. A court cannot properly assess whether a party has
been fraudulently joined without deciding which law should apply to that
determination. The plaintiff ’s ability to state a claim against the nondiverse
defendant is entirely dependent “on the existence of supporting law.”140 If
there is no law that arguably applies to the plaintiff ’s claim against the
nondiverse defendant, then the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
that defendant and the case should remain in federal court.141
B. Assuming Forum Law
Similarly, courts that simply assume forum law applies to the fraudulent
joinder determination are fundamentally mischaracterizing choice of law.
This approach rests on the mistaken assumption that choice of law is merely
a matter of procedure to which the court is free to apply its own law. In
reality, choice of law is undoubtedly substantive: choice of law rules are

139 See Balberdi v. Lewis, No. 12-00582, 2013 WL 1296286, at *2 (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2013) (noting
the strong presumption against removal and against a finding of fraudulent joinder), adopted by
2013 WL 1291780 (D. Haw. Mar. 27, 2013).
140 Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV .
1301, 1305 (1989).
141 See id. at 1306-07 (arguing that if a plaintiff has failed to show that some law applies to the
dispute, the plaintiff has failed to establish a right to relief ) .
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what we use to “define substantive rights” of the parties.142 As Professor
Kramer explains: “[C]hoice of law is not a matter of procedure. It is, in fact,
as substantive as it gets.”143 A court making a choice of law determination “is
deciding what the parties’ rights are in the litigation.”144 Choice of law is
what we use to “defin[e] the elements of a claim or defense.”145 Therefore, a
court that simply applies forum law to the fraudulent joinder inquiry bases
its fraudulent joinder determination on the elements of a claim as defined
by a law that may not even apply to the dispute. The importance of treating
choice of law as substantive is especially pronounced in the fraudulent
joinder context, because fraudulent joinder itself “involves a more substantive look at the claims the diversity-destroying party presents.”146
C. Assuming the Plaintiff ’s Choice of Law
While it is true that fraudulent joinder places a “heavy burden” on the
removing defendant,147 a court should not simply assume the plaintiff ’s
choice of law. The defendant must also have the chance, under the same
heavy burden, to prove its choice of law. A simple acceptance of the plaintiff ’s
choice of law would have the effect of allowing a plaintiff to defeat the
defendant’s right to removal at will. A plaintiff could select any law, regardless of its relationship to the dispute, and plead that law if it allowed the
plaintiff to state a cause of action against the diversity-destroying defendant.
This approach allows the plaintiff to manipulate the choice of law determination. Because forum selection is increasingly important to both parties,148
the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to prove its choice of law
and fraudulent joinder.
D. Making a Choice of Law Prior to the
Fraudulent Joinder Determination
A court that engages in a choice of law analysis, selects a law, and then
conducts the fraudulent joinder inquiry takes the important step of making
a choice of law determination. However, this strategy is also improper
142
143
144
145
146
147

Kramer, supra note 74, at 549.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Monahan, supra note 7, at 1349.
See Collins v. Flynn, No. 08-59, 2008 WL 3851842, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2008) (“The
defendant bears the heavy burden of proving [fraudulent joinder] by clear and convincing
evidence, with all factual and legal ambiguities resolved in favor of plaintiff.”).
148 See supra Section I.A.
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because it mistakenly treats choice of law as if it is “something distinct from,
and antecedent to, the process of ‘applying’ a law to decide the merits.”149 If
there is no colorable law to apply to the plaintiff ’s claim against the
nondiverse defendant, there can be, by definition, no merit in the claim
against that defendant. The choice of law question, therefore, cannot be
decided independently of the merits of the case, yet the approach taken by
these courts depends on the idea that the merits and choice of law questions
are distinct.
Further, in fraudulent joinder litigation, a court cannot approach a
choice of law analysis in the same way that it would if subject matter
jurisdiction had already been established—the court does not yet have this
right.150 Performing an independent choice of law inquiry prior to reaching
the fraudulent joinder question allows the defendant to have a full hearing
on the choice of law issue, which is inappropriate at that stage of the
litigation. This approach is subject to manipulation because the removing
defendant can have his choice of law established in the case merely by
raising a fraudulent joinder claim.
This method also fails to give proper deference to the plaintiff ’s choice
of forum. A plaintiff should have meaningful control over choice of forum.
The “heavy burden” placed on the removing defendant to show fraudulent
joinder is based on a respect for the plaintiff ’s choice of forum and on the
concept that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint. Engaging in a
choice of law analysis prior to the fraudulent joinder inquiry, without
ensuring that the party has met the “heavy burden” placed on a showing of
fraudulent joinder, fails to recognize these principles. Rather than placing
the appropriate burden on the removing defendant, this approach wrongfully
empowers the defendant to challenge the plaintiff ’s choice of law.
E. Applying Fraudulent Joinder Burdens to the
Choice of Law Determination
The same standards that apply to the fraudulent joinder question should
apply to the choice of law question. The choice of law inquiry must be
consistent with the fraudulent joinder burden. Therefore, “choice of law
decisions can be made as part of the fraudulent joinder analysis . . . where
the removing defendant bears the same ‘heavy burden’ to make the choice of
149 Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 24 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 245, 257 (1991).
150 See Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 672 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that the district court was
correct in making a choice of law determination but erred in treating that choice of law question as
if it were deciding it directly).
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law showing” as to make the fraudulent joinder showing.151 Thus, a court
should look to the applicable fraudulent joinder standard in the jurisdiction
(e.g., “no reasonable possibility,” “absolutely no possibility”) and apply that
same standard to the plaintiff ’s choice of law. In other words, to prove
fraudulent joinder, the diverse defendant must show that there is, for
example, “absolutely no possibility” that the plaintiff ’s choice of law applies.
Applying the relevant fraudulent joinder burden to the choice of law
inquiry gives the defendant the opportunity to make a showing of his choice
of law to support his fraudulent joinder allegation without giving him the
opportunity to have a premature full hearing on the issue.
This approach is faithful to the idea that choice of law is a question concerning the merits of the case, rather than “a distinct threshold question that
must be resolved before the court can render a decision on the merits.”152 A
decision can be rendered on the merits of the claim against the alleged
fraudulently joined defendant only with reference to a particular state’s law.
Answering the choice of law question often requires resolving disputed
issues of fact and identifying the interests involved in a particular case—
determinations which are inherently intertwined with the merits. Applying
the unique burdens of the fraudulent joinder structure to the choice of law
determination upholds this understanding of choice of law as a merits
question and gives proper deference to the plaintiff ’s choice of forum.
CONCLUSION
A choice of law determination must be made in the context of fraudulent
joinder litigation. However, that determination is not a freestanding inquiry
but rather an inquiry that must be made with reference to a jurisdiction’s
particular fraudulent joinder standard. Federal courts should apply the same
burden to the choice of law determination that they apply to the fraudulent
joinder showing. A court that applies a “no reasonable possibility” standard
to a finding of fraudulent joinder, for example, should apply that same “no
reasonable possibility” standard to the choice of law determination. Unlike
many existing approaches, this approach recognizes that, in a fraudulent
joinder case, the federal court has not yet established its subject matter
jurisdiction. Therefore, the choice of law inquiry must be modified as
determined by the jurisdiction’s fraudulent joinder rules.
Just as a choice of law analysis undoubtedly involves the merits of a given
case, so too does the fraudulent joinder inquiry. “A decision about fraudulent
151
152

Id.
Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 306 (1990).

2015]

Choice of Law in Fraudulent Joinder Litigation

629

joinder is a decision about merits; it is a decision about the merits of the
case against the non-diverse defendants.”153 Fraudulent joinder litigation
offers federal courts a unique opportunity to delve into the merits of a case,
including the case’s choice of law issues, even prior to establishing subject
matter jurisdiction.
Understanding the appropriate method for choice of law analysis in the
fraudulent joinder context ensures that cases are litigated in the proper
forums. Fraudulent joinder is ultimately a dispute between two sides
arguing to have their case heard in the most favorable forum. Since forum
selection is one of the most important and determinative aspects of a given
case, and proper resolution of the choice of law issue can be dispositive to
the forum determination, a uniform approach is necessary. The suggested
approach for choice of law in fraudulent joinder cases offers an equitable
solution to the problem without unfairly constraining plaintiffs’ choice of
forum or defendants’ statutory right to removal.

153 In re New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d 288, 304 (D.
Mass. 2004).

